Huang et al. (STOC 2018) introduced the fully online matching problem, a generalization of the classic online bipartite matching problem in that it allows all vertices to arrive online and considers general graphs. They showed that the ranking algorithm by Karp et al. (STOC 1990) is strictly better than 0.5-competitive and the problem is strictly harder than the online bipartite matching problem in that no algorithms can be (1 − 1/e)-competitive.
Introduction

Our Contributions and Techniques.
We develop better understandings on the Fully Online Matching problem by establishing two tight competitive ratios. The first result considers the fractional version of the problem, where we are allowed to fractionally match each vertex to multiple neighbors so long as the total mass sum to at most one. We show that the Water-Filling algorithm, which at each vertex's deadline matches its unmatched portion fractionally to all neighbors with smallest matched portion (i.e., the lowest water-level), gets a competitive ratio of 2 − √ 2 ≈ 0.585. We also construct a matching hard instance for Water-Filling. The hardness result applies to arbitrary algorithms if we consider edge arrival models [BST17] , even when preemptions are allowed [ELSW13, McG05] , improving the best known bounds in these models. The second result focuses on the integral problem and the Ranking algorithm. We prove that its competitive ratio is exactly the Ω constant 1 ≈ 0.567 on bipartite graphs, improving the previous bound of ≈ 0.554 and matching the previous hardness result by Huang et Competitive Analysis of Water-Filling. The analysis of the Water-Filling algorithm is the relatively easy part of the paper. We follow the online primal dual framework by Buchbinder et al. [BJN07] , building on the notions of passive and active vertices by Huang et al. [HKT + 18] .
When a vertex u matches another vertex v at u's deadline, Huang et al.
[HKT + 18] referred to u as the active vertex and v as the passive vertex. Intuitively, when edge (u, v) is of concern, v plays a role similar to an offline vertex in the Online Bipartite Matching problem since it sits back and allows u to make the matching decision, while u plays a role similar to an online vertex. Following the same principle, for every vertex v, we refer to the portion that is matched before its deadline as the passive portion, and the portion that is matched at its deadline as the active portion. When a small portion p of edge (u, v) is chosen into the fractional matching, we shall split the gain of p between the endpoints according to the current water-level x v of the passive vertex v (i.e., the one with a later deadline). For some function g to be chosen in the analysis, u shall get 1 − g(x v ) · p while v shall get g(x v ) · p. Then, by an appropriate argument, we can lower bound the total gain of u and v by: (1)
Here, p u is the passive portion of u, and x v is the passive portion of v after u's deadline. The first term is the gain of u due to its passive portion. The second term lower bounds the gain of u due to its active portion. The third term lower bounds of the gain of v due to its passive portion. It remains to choose g to maximize the above lower bound against the worst p u and x v . Unlike in the primal dual analysis of some other online matching problems, this is not exactly a standard ODE. Nonetheless, we observe that it is almost symmetric w.r.t. p u and x v . Indeed, choosing g to be an appropriate linear function makes it symmetric and yields the optimal 2 − √ 2 bound.
Matching Hardness for Water-Filling. Constructing a hard instance to show a matching 2− √ 2 upper bound on the competitive ratio of Water-Filling presents some technical obstacles beyond the existing techniques. The construction is driven by Eqn. (1). By our choice of g, Eqn.
(1) is equal to the lower bound 2 − √ 2 only if p u and x v sum to precisely 2 − √ 2. Further, the performance of the algorithm is equal to the gain of the endpoints summing over all edges in the optimal matching in hindsight. Therefore, a matching hard instance must satisfy that before the matching decision is made for an edge (u, v) in the optimal matching, the water-levels of the two endpoints are prepared in advance so that the sum equals 2 − √ 2. This suggests that a tight instance for Water-Filling must look very different from the existing hard instances in the previous works (e.g., [KVV90, DJ12, HKT + 18]), where for every edge (u, v) in the optimal matching, one of the two endpoints simply shows up with zero water-level and a matching decision is made for the edge. 2 It is easy to show that one cannot maintain at all time that some vertices have 2 − √ 2 water-level while the other have 0 with the Water-Filling algorithm.
Our construction prepares the water-level of the vertices via a dynamic as follows. It maintains at all time a set of vertices with some number of vertices at each water-level x for 0 ≤ x ≤ 2 − √ 2. At each step, pick a vertex u with an appropriate water-level x u and let it be u's deadline. Vertex u connects to a subset of the vertices with water-level 2 − √ 2 − x u , among which one vertex v is u's partner in the optimal matching. After the step, u and v will be removed from the pool; new vertices (with zero water-level) will arrive to refill the pool if needed. The matching decision of u "pumps up" the water-level of all its neighbors to 2 − √ 2 − x u + . Some of them will serve as the active endpoints with this water-level of some edges in the optimal matching; some of them will serve as the passive counterparts; the water-level of the remaining will be further "pumped up" by some vertex with water-level x u − . We show how to maintain such a dynamic so that, in the long run, the endpoints of any edge in the optimal matching will have a total water-level close to 2 − √ 2 when a matching decision is made for the edge.
Competitive Analysis of Ranking on Bipartite Graphs. We first explain why the previous analysis of Huang et al. [HKT + 18] is not tight on their hard instance. Consider an edge (u, v) in the optimal matching where u has an earlier deadline. The previous analysis is tight only if there is a threshold θ such that whenever v's rank is larger than θ, u is matched and v is unmatched and, more importantly, whenever v's rank is smaller than θ, v is passively matched and u matches to the same vertex as in the previous case. In the hard instance, however, u is v's only neighbor. Therefore, if u's own rank is sufficiently large such that u matches actively, u and v will match each other when v's rank is smaller than θ. Taking this extra gain into account gives the optimal ratio of ≈ 0.567 for the hard instance.
Of course, we cannot naïvely assume that one of the endpoints of any edge in the optimal matching will have only one neighbor. The point is the previous approach that tries to characterize the matching status of u and v using a single threshold of v cannot possibly capture the above extra gain. We show that a good enough characterization in general takes three thresholds, a threshold of u and two thresholds of v, one with u in the graph and one without. As a result, we get a new lower bound on the total expected gain of the endpoints that is strictly better than the previous one in all but a few bottleneck cases. Then, we design a different gain sharing function that focuses on these bottleneck cases to obtain a tight analysis.
Finally, we remark that the three thresholds pin down when u and v match each other. Previous works on online matching usually omit the gain from this case, which indeed happens with negligible probability in the worst case of those models (with a recent exception of [HTWZ18] ). Our analysis shows it was just a lucky coincident that we do not need to consider the case when the endpoints match each other in those problems. It becomes critical in a more general online matching model. WW15] are based on the online primal dual framework by [BJN07] . This paper further illustrates the power of this framework for studying online fractional matching problems.
Other Related Works
The hardness result in this paper improves the bounds for the following online matching models. In online preemptive matching [ELSW13, McG05] , each edge arrives online and the algorithm must immediately decide whether to add the edge to the matching and to dispose of previously selected edges if needed. A harder edge-arrival model [BST17] forbids edge disposals. For both problems, the best previous bound stands at 1 1+ln 2 ≈ 0.5906 [ELSW13] . Very recently, weighted variants of Fully Online Matching have been studied by [ABJS18, DS18] , both considering the "windowed" version of the problem, motivated by the ride-sharing applications.
Preliminaries
We study both the fractional and the integral versions of Fully Online Matching. When the underlying graph is bipartite, we refer to the problem as Fully Online Bipartite Matching. Consider the following standard linear program formulation of the matching problem and its dual.
In this setting, we may match edges fractionally. Let x uv ∈ [0, 1] be the fraction of edge (u, v) in the matching. Assuming u has an earlier deadline than v, this variable increases only at u's deadline. We refer to it as Fully Online Fractional Matching and study the classic Water-Filling algorithm (e.g., [BJN07] ) in this setting. We give a formal definition of the algorithm below, in which the dual variables are updated as well. Note that the dual variables are used only in the analysis. We fix an increasing function g : [0, 1] → [0, 1] to be specified later and use x u def = v:(u,v)∈E x uv to keep track of the water-level (i.e. total fractional mass) of u at all time.
Algorithm 1 The Water-Filling Algorithm
Initialize all x uv 's and α u 's to be zero. When the deadline of vertex u is reached: Let p u = x u be the water-level collected before u's deadline. p u : passive water-level of u. Let N (u) be the set of neighbors of u whose deadlines are not reached. while x u < 1 and min
If x uv increases by dx, increase α u and α v respectively by
We call the vertices in N (u) the available neighbors of u at u's deadline. We further import the notions of active and passive vertices from [HKT + 18] and define them for both fractional and integral algorithms.
Definition 2.1 (Active, Passive) For any edge (u, v) that is (fractionally) matched by an algorithm at u's deadline, we say that u is active and v is passive (w.r.t. edge (u, v)). Let M ( y) denote the matching produced when Ranking is run with y as the ranks.
Definition 2.2 (Marginal Rank [HKT + 18])
For any u and any ranks y -u of other vertices, the marginal rank θ of u w.r.t. y -u is the largest value such that u is passive in
The following is a restatement of Lemma 2.5 from [HKT + 18] when restricted to bipartite graphs.
Lemma 2.1 In a bipartite graph, if u is matched in y, then from M ( y) to M ( y -u ), all neighbors of u do not get better. Here, passive is better than active, which is in turns better than unmatched. Conditioned on being passive, matching to a vertex with earlier deadline is better. Conditioned on being active, matching to a vertex with smaller rank is better.
We set primal variables according to Ranking. The randomized primal dual technique [DJK13] allows us to prove competitive ratio bounds through the following.
Lemma 2.2 ([HKT
18], Lemma 2.6) Ranking is F -competitive if we can set (non-negative) dual variables such that 1) (u,v)∈E x uv = u∈V α u ; and 2)
Tight Competitive Ratio of Water-Filling
In this section, we give a tight analysis on the competitive ratio of the Water-Filling algorithm for the Fully Online Fractional Matching problem.
Lower Bound on the Competitive Ratio
We first prove that the competitive ratio of Water-Filling is at least 2 − √ 2. Our approach is based on a primal dual analysis.
Proof: Recall that we update the primal variables according to Water-Filling and dual variables in a way that the dual objective always equals the primal objective. Using the standard primal dual technique, in order to prove that Water-Filling is (2 − √ 2)-competitive, it suffices to show that α u + α v ≥ 2 − √ 2 for all pairs of neighbors u and v.
2 be the function we used for defining dual variables.
Fix any pair of neighbors u, v where u has an earlier deadline than v. Consider the moment right after u's deadline. It must be that either x u = 1 or x v = 1 (otherwise x u will further increase). As v can only be matched passively, if x v = 1, we have
Now suppose x u = 1 and x v < 1. Then, we have α v = xv 0 g(x)dx. Next, consider the value of α u . Before u's deadline, we have α u = pu 0 g(x)dx (recall that p u is the passive water-level of u). Since x u = 1, and the water-level of v after the deadline of u is x v < 1, at any moment when the water-level of u is increased from p u to 1, the neighbor that u matches has a water-level at most x v . Hence, we have
Summing the lower bounds on the two dual variables and by the definition of g, we have
Hence, in both cases we have α u + α v ≥ 2 − √ 2, which gives the 2 − √ 2 lower bound on the competitive ratio of Water-Filling.
Upper Bound on the Competitive Ratio
In this section we explicitly construct a hard instance, for which Water-Filling gives a solution of value (2 − √ 2) · OPT.
Hard Instance. Let there be 2k · m vertices, which are partitioned into m groups of size 2k. For all t ∈ [m], let the vertices in the t-th group be U t ∪ V t , where U t = {u t,1 , . . . , u t,k } and
] be a decreasing function 3 (to be determined later) with h(0) = 1 and h(1) = 0. There are two types of edges in the graph (refer to Figure 2 ):
Upper triangle edges between U t and
h-induced edges between U t and ≈ 0.5906 hard instance by [ELSW13] for the edge arrival model.
Finally, let the deadlines of the u vertices be reached first, following the lexicographical order on (t, i). Then let the deadlines of the v vertices be reached, i.e., after the deadline of u m,k . 4 It is easy to see that the hard instance is bipartite, where (
are the two sides of vertices. This graph admits a perfect matching, in which u t,i matches v t,i for all t ∈ [m], i ∈ [k] and hence, OPT = km.
We 
Then, we only need to check that
which is true as f is defined such that for all φ ∈ [0, c],
Taking integration from 0 to c, the contributions of the 2nd and the 3rd terms cancel. We have Now we analyze the performance of Water-Filling on this instance. We first prove that by running Water-Filling on the hard instance, the passive water-levels of almost all vertices are strictly smaller than 1. Lemma 3.2 For large enough k, Water-Filling produces a fractional matching with p u t,i < 1 for all
Proof: Observe that at the deadline of each u t,i , where
k ) neighbors whose deadlines are not reached. Moreover, as h is decreasing, it is easy to see (by induction) that at the deadline of u t,i , all available neighbors of u t,i have the same water-level. Hence, Water-Filling increases the water-level of the available neighbors of u t,i at the same rate until min v∈N (u t,i ) x v = 1 or x u t,i = 1.
Since u t+1,1 is a neighbor of every vertex in U t , we have p u t+1,1 = max j∈[k] {p u t+1,j , p v t,j }. Therefore, it suffices to show that p u t+1,1 is smaller than 1. Note that each vertex u t,i has at most 1 unit of unmatched portion that is distributed among k − i + 1 + k · h( i−1 k ) available neighbors and, thus, it increases the water-level of u t+1,1 by at most
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 3.1. This finishes the proof.
Lemma 3.2 implies that, for large enough k, we can guarantee that when running Water-Filling on the hard instance, after the deadline of every u t,i , where t ∈ [m − 1], we must have x u t,i = 1, as none of its neighbors with a later deadline has a water-level that reaches 1.
Corollary 1 For all t ∈ [m − 1], we have x u t,i = 1 after u t,i 's deadline. Now we are ready to prove the main theorem of this section. Proof: Let p t = (p u t,1 , p u t,2 , . . . , p u t,k ) T denote the passive water-level vector of U t . Since the increment of matching at u t,i 's deadline is at most 1 − p u t,i , the solution given by Water-Filling is
Indeed, by Corollary 1, for all t ∈ [m − 1], the increment of matching at u t,i 's deadline is exactly 1 − p u t,i . Recall that in the hard instance, u t+1,i is a neighbor of u t,j iff
is independent of t. In other words, there exists a 
That is, M is a contraction matrix and the above mapping from p t to p t+1 has a unique stationary vector p * , i.e. p * = M(1 − p * ). Moreover, lim t→∞ p t = p * 5 . Thus, for any fixed k, when 5 Observe that (pt+1 − p * ) = M(p * − pt) and M is a contraction matrix.
m → ∞, the ratio between the matching size of Water-Filling and the optimal is
Finally, we consider when k → ∞ and calculate the stationary vector. In this case, p * becomes a function p : [0, 1] → [0, 1] and the linear equation p * = M(1 − p * ) becomes the following
We verify that p = τ is a solution to this system of equations by Lemma 3.1. For all x, we have
Thus, the ratio between Water-Filling and OPT is 1
Interestingly, we show that our hardness result applies to the edge-arrival models of the online matching problems. In the Online Edge Arrival Matching problem [BST17] , at each step, an edge arrives online and the algorithm must irrevocably decide whether to add the edge to the matching; in the preemptive setting (Online Preemptive Matching [ELSW13, McG05] ), instead, we are allowed to dispose of edges in the matching before accepting a new edge.
Corollary 2 No algorithm can be better than (2−
√ 2)-competitive for Online Edge Arrival Matching and Online Preemptive Matching, even if fractional matching is allowed.
Proof: Since the edge arrival model (resp. integral matching) is strictly harder than the preemptive model (resp. fractional matching), it suffices to consider the second model with fractional matching. Consider the previous hard instance with the following modifications. The underlying graph remains the same and each vertex is associated with the same deadline as before. At u t,i 's deadline, its incident edges with available neighbors are revealed one by one. In this way, all available neighbors of u t,i are indistinguishable at this moment, i.e. they share the same set of neighbors. Thus by assigning random identities to these vertices, the available neighbors of u t,i have the same expected increment in matched fraction. Moreover, since no edge incident to each vertex comes after its deadline, it is not beneficial for an algorithm to dispose of previously chosen edges. Therefore, no algorithm can do better than Water-Filling in expectation and the lower bound 2 − √ 2 applies.
Tight Competitive Ratio of Ranking on Bipartite Graphs
Let Ω ≈ 0.5671 denote the Omega constant, which is the solution for the equation Ω·e Ω = 1. In this section, we prove that Ranking is Ω-competitive for the Fully Online Bipartite Matching, matching the Ω hardness result given by Huang et al.
[HKT + 18].
Theorem 4.1 Ranking is Ω-competitive for Fully Online Bipartite Matching.
We adopt the randomized primal dual analysis from [HKT + 18]. Recall the dual assignment that distributes the gain of each matched edge between its two endpoints as follows. 
Our main technical contribution is an improved version of the above lower bound. Indeed, using Fact 4.1 as a lower bound, one cannot achieve a competitive ratio greater than 0.56 by just optimizing g. 6 In the following, we will first illustrate how this lower bound can be improved for the hard instance given in [HKT + 18]. Then, we show in Section 4.2 how to prove the Ω competitive ratio for general instances.
Better Competitive Ratio for the Hard Instance
Recall the following hard instance for Ranking that is given by [HKT + 18]. In the instance (refer to Figure 3) , the vertices are organized into (infinitely many) groups of size 2k, where each group U t ∪ V t induces a perfect matching. For all t ∈ [m − 1], the vertices U t and U t+1 are connected by a complete bipartite graph. The deadline of every u t,i is earlier than v t,i , and deadlines of u t,i follow the lexicographic order on (t, i). It is shown in [HKT + 18] that when running Ranking on the above instance, at the deadline of the first vertex of each group, e.g., u t,1 , the expected fraction of unmatched vertices in U t (which is also the competitive ratio of Ranking) is given by the equation x = e −x . In other words, the competitive ratio of Ranking is Ω on the above instance (when k → ∞).
Prev Prev
In the following, we show that the competitive ratio of Ranking is Ω, using the randomized primal dual framework, and explain what is missing in the previous analysis. Fix any pair of neighbors u, v in the same group s.t. u has an earlier deadline than v. Next, we fix the ranks of all vertices but v arbitrarily, and lower bound E yv [α u + α v ] for any edge (u, v) that appears in the perfect matching 7 .
6 The function g is not optimized in [HKT + 18] with respect to their lower bound. However, the ratio is less than 0.56 with the optimal g function.
7 Note that the competitive ratio equals u E [αu] = (u,v) appears in the perfect matching E [αu + αv].
Observe that u is the only neighbor of v. If u is passive, then v is unmatched regardless of y v , which implies E yv [α u + α v ] = g(y u ). Otherwise, let θ be the marginal rank of v. By definition, when y v > θ, u matches a vertex with rank θ and hence α u = 1 − g(θ). For the case when y v < θ, it is shown in [HKT + 18] (using Lemma 2.1) that u does not get worse: u either is passive, or actively matches a vertex with rank at most θ. That is, α u ≥ min{g(y u ), 1 − g(θ)} when y v < θ. However, for the specific hard instance given in Figure 3 , u is v's only neighbor. Hence, u and v will match each other when y v < θ. Therefore, we have
Together with the case when u is passive, we have that
This bound is strictly stronger than Fact 4.1, as we fully characterize the gain of α u when y v is smaller than its marginal rank, rather than the loose lower bound min{g(y u ), 1 − g(θ)} given in [HKT + 18]. By taking expectation over y u and optimizing the function g(·) (see Section 4.2), the above lower bound implies that Ranking is Ω-competitive on the hard instance.
In general, v does not necessarily match u when y v < θ. However, when this fails to happen, we are able to retrieve extra gain of α v when u is passive. (Recall that in the hard instance, v is unmatched when u is passive.) The complete analysis involves a more careful treatment that considers the randomness of y u , y v at the same time, when deriving the lower bound.
Proof of Theorem 4.1
Consider any neighboring vertices u and v. In the following, we fix an arbitrary assignment of ranks to all vertices but u, v. We denote this assignment of ranks by y -uv . Unless otherwise specified, we use E [·] to denote the expectation taken over the randomness of y u and y v .
Instead of using a single threshold θ of v as in the previous analysis, we will make use of multiple thresholds to give a good enough characterization of the matching status of u and v in order to derive the tight competitive ratio. We introduce the first two below.
Definition 4.1 (τ and γ) Consider the graph G−{v} with v removed. Let τ be the marginal rank of u w.r.t. y -uv . In other words, u is passive iff M (y u < τ, y -uv ). Similarly, let γ be the marginal rank of v w.r.t. y -uv in graph G − {u}, i.e., with u removed.
Consider y u = y < τ . By the definition of τ , we know that for all y v ∈ [0, 1], u is passive in M (y u = y, y v , y -uv ), because inserting v (with any rank) to the graph cannot make u worse (by Lemma 2.1). Thus, for all y u < τ and y v ∈ [0, 1], we have α u = g(y u ), which correspond to the first term of the RHS. For the same reason, for all y u ∈ [0, 1], v is passive in M (y v < γ, y u , y -uv ), which gives α v = g(y v ), and the second term of the RHS.
For all y u ∈ [0, 1], let θ(y u ) be the marginal rank of v w.r.t. y -v = (y u , y -uv ). Recall v is always passive (regardless of y u ) when y v < γ. Hence, we have θ(y u ) ≥ γ for all y u ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 4.2 For any fixed y u > τ , we have
Proof: By the definition of θ(y u ), we know that when y v = θ(y u ) + (slightly larger than θ(y u )), v is not passive. Thus, u must be matched. Moreover, u must be active. Otherwise u should remain passive when v is removed, because the deadline of v is later than u, which contradicts the definition of τ (recall that we fix some y u > τ ). Hence, when y v = θ(y u ) + , u actively matches some vertex with rank at most θ(y u ). As increasing the rank of v does not create any difference to the final matching, for all y v > θ(y u ), we have α u ≥ 1 − g(θ(y u )).
Note that it is possible that θ(y u ) = 1, i.e., v is passive for all rank y v ∈ [0, 1], in which case the above lower bound still holds. Since the graph is bipartite, by Lemma 2.1, for all y v < θ(y u ), we have α u ≥ min{g(y u ), 1 − g(θ(y u ))}.
Finally, we show that for any y v ∈ (γ, θ(y u )), we have α u + α v ≥ 1. Fix any y v ∈ (γ, θ(y u )). By definition v is passive. Consider the first moment when one of u, v is matched.
Suppose at this moment, v is matched (passively) by some vertex z. Then, we show that z = u, which gives α u + α v = 1. Otherwise, z must have an earlier deadline than u. Then, we know that v remains passive with u removed, which contradicts the definition of γ.
Suppose at this moment, u is matched. Then we know that u must active, as otherwise u remains passive with v removed, which contradicts the definition of τ . Suppose u matches some vertex z. Since v is not matched at this moment, the rank of z is no more than y v , which implies
To sum up, for any fixed y u > τ , we have
as claimed.
Combing the two lemmas, we have the following lower bound. Observe that the following bound degrades to the one we derived for the hard instance in Subsection 4.1, when γ = 0. Proof: First, we show that there exists θ such that θ(y u ) = θ for all y u > τ . Consider the graph with v removed, and let y u = τ + . By the definition of τ , u is not passive.
1. If u is unmatched, then we know that after inserting v with any y v ∈ [0, 1], v is passive, as otherwise u will be matched with v removed. Hence, we have θ(y u ) = 1 for all y u > τ ;
2. Otherwise, u is active. Let θ = θ(τ + ). Then, we know that v is not passive when inserted to the graph with y v = θ + . Moreover, we know that u is active after the insertion: if u is passive, then u remains passive with v removed, which contradicts the definition of τ . Since increasing y u does not change the matching, we have θ(y u ) ≤ θ for all y u > τ . On the other hand, when y v = θ -and y u = τ + , u is active and v is passive. Since increasing y u does not change the matching, we have θ(y u ) ≥ θ for all y u > τ . The sandwiching bounds imply that θ(y u ) = θ for all y u > τ .
Hence, combining Lemma 4.1 and 4.2, we have = (γ − θ) · g(θ) ≤ 0.
Here, the last inequality holds because we have θ ≥ γ by their definitions. Thus, the minimum of f (τ, γ, θ) over τ ∈ [0, 1], 0 ≤ γ ≤ θ ≤ 1 must be obtained when g(τ ) ≥ 1 − g(θ). As a result, we get that f (τ, γ, θ) = If we relax the constraint that θ ≥ γ, then the maximum of (1 − θ + γ)g(θ) is achieved when θ * = 1−2c 1−c (for which g(θ * ) = 1 − c). Note that the maximum is ( 
